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I. Introduction  
In present times, dagga is found everywhere, be it in the form of news in the press or 
South African Police Service (SAPS) media statements, controversial expressions in 
private conversations, or only as a smell that wafts towards you as you walk down the 
street. The herb was criminalised around 100 years ago, and its use has been punished 
ever since. It was partially decriminalised nearly two years ago as a result of case law. 
However, it seems that rumours and misconceptions about its effects and harm, as well 
as the exact legal situation, are still widely spread. It is important to engage with the 
misunderstanding around dagga and its supposed decriminalisation – this will be done 
in this dissertation. 
When I started my research on the topic, it was difficult to find literature focusing on 
current changes. Basically, all the information that I could find was at least some years 
– if not decades – old and, thus, outdated. My contribution is to give an overview of 
the current legal developments, including their origins, for a better understanding of 
how all of these different stages and developments are tied together. Thus, this thesis 
is limited to providing new angles and connections. It aims to introduce new lines of 
reasoning as to the recent developments in light of long-past occurrences. This is in 
order to show how the past still affects the present. In my view, the scholarly literature 
on dagga is full of very specific research and tackles discrete issues but lacks an overall 
connection between the different scholarly papers and their findings to date, something 
which this thesis aims to provide. Finally, this thesis supports and substantiates the 
decriminalisation of cannabis and its benefits in South Africa.  
The decision to write about this topic is based primarily on personal curiosity. In my 
home country, Germany, the use of cannabis is still a punishable offence, despite 
recurring and long-lasting debates. When I came to South Africa, I noticed how freely 
people deal with the topic and what a big presence dagga consumption has in many of 
their lives. This is very different to what I have experienced in my home country. Using 
the exciting idea of the comparative perspective to Germany, I started to research the 
topic of the decriminalisation of cannabis and soon came across the inevitable history 
of its former criminalisation. I was fascinated by this story with its clearly racialised 
roots, which is why I decided to take a closer look and engage with the topic of the 




I will commence this thesis by engaging with the historical background, where I will 
examine the route of the use and cultivation of dagga in South Africa as well as the 
history of how it came to be criminalised. After dealing with the legal development 
around dagga, I will compare it to other drugs, arguing that the harsh dagga legislation 
is deeply rooted in the colonial past and driven by various factors, one of them being 
racism. In the following sections, this thesis will discuss in detail the two recent 
judgements which partially decriminalised dagga,1 a long-overdue step. The last 
chapter looks at the status of the criminal justice system in relation to the 
decriminalisation of dagga.  
For reasons of consistency and comprehensibility, it is important to clarify some terms 
and explain their usage. First of all, I use the terms ‘cannabis’ and ‘dagga’ – how it is 
commonly referred to in South Africa – interchangeably, just as the legislation does.2 
In this context, ‘cannabis’ stands for the whole plant, cannabis sativa, or any part or 
product thereof. This term is also used in accordance with legal provisions.3 Cannabis 
sativa, however, means ‘cultivated cannabis’ and is the plant usually referred to when 
speaking about dagga intoxication in South Africa.4 
Further, there is the need to distinguish between – or rather, to determine the distinct 
meanings of – legalising a certain substance and decriminalising it. Whereas there has 
been disagreement about the exact distinction of illegality and criminalisation for 
centuries, it is not only suitable but important to clearly define the use of the terms 
within this dissertation. While legalisation includes permitting the substance or its use, 
possession, cultivation, etc., decriminalisation does not go that far. When 
decriminalising a substance or a certain use, the status of illegality is maintained. At 
 
1 Prince v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others; Rubin v National Director of 
Public Prosecutions and Others; Acton and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions and 
Others (4153/2012) [2017] ZAWCHC 30; [2017] 2 All SA 864 (WCC); 2017 (4) SA 299 (WCC), referred 
to as Prince II. 1, available at: http://www.saflii.org/cgi-
bin/disp.pl?file=za/cases/ZAWCHC/2017/30.html&query=%20Prince, accessed on 05 January 2020; 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others v Prince; National Director of Public 
Prosecutions and Others v Rubin; National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others v Acton and 
Others [2018] ZACC 30 para 25, referred to as Prince II.2, available at: http://www.saflii.org/cgi-
bin/disp.pl?file=za/cases/ZACC/2018/30.html&query=prince, accessed on 10 October 2019. 
2 Part III of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992. 
3 Ibid.  
4 Craig Paterson Prohibition & Resistance: A Socio-Political Exploration of the Changing Dynamics of 
the Southern African Cannabis Trade, c. 1850 – the present. (published master thesis, Rhodes 




the same time, there will be no criminal charges for decriminalised behaviour.5 In this 
special case of decriminalising dagga in South Africa, it was explicitly held that even 
if charges are pressed, the constitutional right to privacy will serve as a valid defence.6 
In other words, when decriminalised, the substance or its use is still prohibited, but if 
used anyway, there will not be any criminal consequences in terms of punishment such 
as fines or incarceration. 
In short, this thesis will be about the long-lasting demonisation of cannabis and the 
final relief in the form of decriminalisation, as illustrated by two judgements. We are 
already experiencing short-term benefits rooted in the decriminalisation such as the 
decreasing number of arrests for dagga offences and are eagerly awaiting further 
benefits. The next chapter will look at the historical background, not only 
demonstrating how dagga was criminalised, but also examining other socio-political 
developments surrounding the criminalisation. 
 
II. History of (criminalising) dagga in South Africa 
The history of dagga in South Africa is a history of its criminalisation. The use of 
dagga as a drug attracts one of the harshest punishments. Its use and diffusion, as well 
as other characteristics, are tightly connected to the legislation surrounding it at any 
point in time. And still, for one to understand the ‘whole story’ around this demonised 
herb becoming the social evil it is seen as by many, it is essential to research what 
happened before dagga was made illegal. It is thus important to navigate its history in 
order to understand the contradictions arising around dagga.  
This chapter will firstly examine the pre-colonial times, long before dagga was first 
mentioned in writing by Jan van Riebeeck and other settlers.7 The use and diffusion of 
dagga during the early colonial period will be another focus, asking what, if anything, 
 
5 Sultan Khan ‘Legalize It, Don’t Criminalise It: The Cannabis Discourse in South Africa’ Acta 
Criminologica: Southern African Journal of Criminology (2015) 171. 
6 Prince II.2 supra note 1 para 113-14; News 24 ‘How the Western Cape High Court dagga judgment 
applies to you’ Daily Maverick 31 March 2017, available at 
https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-03-31-how-the-western-cape-high-court-dagga-
judgment-applies-to-you/#gsc.tab=0, accessed on 27 June 2020; Emma Charlene Lubaale, Simangele 
Daisy Mavundla ‘Decriminalisation of cannabis for personal use in South Africa’ (2019) 19 African 
Human Rights Law Journal 841.  
7 Hazel Crampton Dagga: A Short History (2015) 1; François Theron The Dagga Problem: A 
Sociological Perspective with Special Reference To The Question Of Social Policy (published master 




changed around the status of dagga due to the long-lasting occupation with its 
emerging economy. Finally, this chapter will evaluate the early legal regulations 
around dagga at the beginning of the 20th century as well as the further development 
of the legal framework up until 2018. With this, there will be a shift away from rather 
strictly historical matters and facts towards a more legal analysis. 
 
1. Before the white man came – pre-colonial conditions 
In 1658, Jan van Riebeeck made notes about a certain plant in his diary. These 
observations were to become famous for the first-ever written reference to cannabis in 
a South African context.8 What this documentation does not reveal at first sight is that 
the herb commonly named dagga, had been cultivated and used long before this 
moment. When van Riebeeck arrived at the Cape, the history of dagga already went 
back hundreds of years.9  
Bearing this in mind, one could get the idea that dagga is native to southern Africa. 
But this is wrong, as the plant is originally from Central Asia.10 The exact diffusion 
and lines of how it spread are not agreed upon by scholars, especially when it comes 
to an exact ‘centre of origin’ as well as narrowing down the date of its first 
introduction.11 There is some consensus, however, that by about 4200-4000 BC it had 
reached China, where records exist about the use of the plant as fibre.12 Further 
evidence of its ancient use13 as well as religious Hindu texts describing its creation14 
were found in India which leads to the assumption that the plant also reached India at 
an early point in time, if not being native to this area of Asia.  
Growing and having been used in Asia for several centuries, the plant was only brought 
to the subcontinent by Arabs somewhere between the 12th and the 16th century15 due 
to the spread of the Arab trading routes.16 The early trading routes in southern Africa 
 
8 Crampton op cit note 7 at 1; Theron op cit note 7 at 97. 
9 Theron op cit note 7 at 97. 
10 Paterson op cit note 4 at 17; Crampton op cit note 7 at 11.  
11 Compare, e.g., Crampton op cit note 7 at 11 and Paterson op cit note 4 at 17-8 for a detailed 
evaluation.  
12 Robert Connell Clarke as cited in Paterson op cit note 4 at 17-8; Crampton op cit note 7 at 11. 
13 Robert Connell Clarke as cited in Paterson op cit note 4 at 17-8.  
14 Crampton op cit note 7 at 11. 
15 Compare different opinions such as Crampton op cit note 7 at 14, Paterson op cit note 4 at 20, and 
Theron op cit note 7 at 97. 




brought the plant from the shores of the Indian Ocean,17 especially today’s Zanzibar 
and Mozambique,18 into the heart of the African continent.  
As competing as the opinions about the actual origin of the plant are, so too are the 
views regarding the origin of the name ‘dagga’. One of the more plausible explanations 
is the one Theron picks up on in his thesis, being that ‘dagga’, as the Afrikaans people 
used to write it, comes from the Khoikhoi19 (or Khoi) word ‘dachah’.20 
It seems certain, however, that nearly all the inhabitants of indigenous Southern Africa 
used the herb dagga, and used it for different reasons, such as recreational or medical 
ones.21 It can rightfully be seen as an ancient custom.22 This custom has been followed 
by, amongst others, the Khoi, the San, the Sotoh-Twana and Nguni.23 The Khoikhoi 
and their use of dagga are also explicitly named by van Riebeeck in his journal. He 
seemed to be particularly interested in this unknown plant.24 Whether it is, as Kowalski 
names it incorrectly, to believe that the Khoikhoi were the main cultivators of dagga 
in southern Africa25 or that the Hancumqua actually cultivated the herb and only sold 
it to the Khoikhoi,26 dagga, in any case, constituted a valuable trading commodity 
among various indigenous groups.  
The exact use, as well as the social norms concerning dagga, differed from one ethnic 
groups to another.27 Although it is difficult to access reliable details due to a lack of 
substantial written evidence, Peterson shows in his thesis that dagga managed to 
establish a certain cultural significance for indigenous communities, as it formed part 
of their regular customs.28 The Zulu tribes, for example, encouraged their warriors to 
smoke dagga in order to increase their abilities and decrease their fear.29 Other groups 
 
17 Crampton op cit note 7 at 15. 
18 Theron op cit note 7 at 97. 
19 Due to its derogatory meaning, the term ´Hottentot‘, which was originally used by Theron, was 
replaced by the less compromising term ´Khokhoi‘ which stands for the same group of indigenous 
people. 
20 Theron op cit note 7 at 97; For more detailed discussions about the origin of the word ‘dagga‘, see: 
Paterson op cit note 4 ch. 1.  
21 Jonathan Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 5 ed (2016) 821; Kelly Maxine Kowalski 
Decriminalization of Cannabis – High Time to Revisit Prince (published LLM thesis, University of Cape 
Town, 2016) 7.  
22 Theron op cit note 7 at 97.  
23 Crampton op cit note 7 at 10. 
24 Theron op cit note 7 at 97. 
25 Kowalski op cit note 21 at 7. 
26 Crampton op cit note 7 at 2. 
27 Theron op cit note 7 at 97. 
28 For more detail see Paterson op cit note 4 at 26-31. 




such as the Nguni smoked dagga as a purely social custom and their members never 
used it while on their own.30 In general, smoking dagga appears to have been a form 
of drug use which was often tightly linked to social situations31 and, as this shows, was 
perceived to be a positive action. Although usually there were certain rules such as the 
prohibition of dagga for women or youths,32 when smoked in moderation, dagga was 
not linked to any kind of reprehensible behaviour nor did it carry any stigma. It was 
used among the different ranks of a group and was not reserved for those in high 
office.33  
The findings of this subchapter show how widely spread and ‘normal’ the use of dagga 
was in pre-colonial times. The herb was highly appreciated by people from different 
kinds of groups, as it was of great value both in terms of trading and personal use. 
During this time, there is no indication of the ‘evil’ that dagga would be viewed as in 
the future. And it is not that this different view could be attributed to a lack of 
understanding of the dangers or negative effects of its use amongst the indigenous 
people. On the contrary, there are records showing that some people abused the drug. 
When doing this in violation of the rights of others, these people were ostracised.34  
 
2. Van Riebeeck is here – has anything changed?  
One question is whether the widely spread use of and trade in dagga changed during 
the colonial era. To put it very briefly, the answer is no. 
During the centuries following colonial settlement up until the early 20th century, the 
frequency of use did not decrease. Dagga also continued to be, as Crampton puts it, a 
‘perfectly legal substance’.35 Trading continued as freely as before, and there was no 
difference compared to the trade of other goods.36 
Although the use among white settlers was at best of minor significance, there are 
historical reports about the old Trekboers sometimes even smoking dagga themselves 
 
30 Ibid. 
31 See also Paterson’s descriptions in Paterson op cit note 4 at 29. 
32 Theron op cit note 7 at 98. 
33 Ibid.  
34 Theron op cit note 7 at 98-9.  
35 See Crampton op cit note 7 ch. 1, especially at 5. 




for recreational purposes.37 And even for those settlers not smoking it, they found ways 
to still profit from this entrenched economy. There is evidence, for example, that the 
white missionaries at former Klaarwater traded self-grown dagga from their church 
gardens with indigenous tribes such as the San or the Bushmen.38 Others also 
cultivated it on their farms since it was very common and rather easy to grow and 
instead of using it themselves, they traded it or gave it to their labourers for whom it 
had personal value.39 
During the colonial period, there was more data recorded40 which makes research 
easier. Thus, assumptions about cultivation and trade are more reliable. Further, there 
are writings about all kinds of medicinal applications and effects,41 published by highly 
valued academies such as Die Suid-Afrikaanse Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns as 
well as other advertisements in the press.42  
All of this shows that up until this time, the perception of dagga by the white settlers 
was not negative at all; they used it as much as they could to their own advantage, and 
thus, in line with these values, did not criticise anything that strengthened their 
economy.43 
 
3. The start of the period of prohibition – dagga as the ‘social evil’  
The dominating attitude of the time can be described as justifying immoral behaviour 
for the sake of the colonialists’ own purposes. These particularly included the aim of 
maximising their own profits. At the beginning of the 19th century, this attitude started 
to change. Paterson claims that it is during this period that ‘one begins to find 
references to the settler's cultivation of dagga being rendered with disdain’.44  
Still, even a hundred years later, in the early 20th century, this increasing reprehension 
did not find its way into law. Even most magistrates’ reports from this time did not 
often engage with dagga. More emphasis was on the abuse of alcohol and issues 
 
37 Kahn as cited in Crampton op cit note 7 at 6.  
38 Crampton op cit note 7 at 5-6. 
39 Paterson op cit note 4 at 34. 
40 Crampton op cit note 7 at 2. 
41 For more detail on these findings see Crampton op cit note 7 at 6. 
42 Kahn as cited in Crampton op cit note 7 at 6.  
43 Paterson op cit note 4 at 32-3.  




following from that. Even though some magistrates called smoking dagga an ‘evil 
habit’, in general, there was not much attention raised around it.45 Especially compared 
to other issues such as alcohol, the use of dagga was not seen as a major problem. 
The first legal regulations concerning dagga were passed in 1903 by the Orange Free 
State and the Orange River Colony, both only prohibiting the action of dealing in 
dagga.46 Apart from these, there was no legislation passed until the nationwide 
Customs and Excise Duties Amendment Act 35 of 192247 which, for the first time, 
prohibited the use and possession of ‘habit-forming drugs’ including dagga.48 The bill 
also regulated the import, transport, and sale of these kinds of drugs,  including 
cocaine, heroin, morphine, opium and other synthetic substances.49 According to 
Chanock, the development of national legislation can be ascribed to moral panic 
arising out of public debates about links that were made between people being under 
the influence of dagga and the crimes they committed.50 Taking it further, smoking 
dagga was now openly linked to the decreasing efficiency of labourers, especially 
those working on farms.51 The plant, and all its derivatives were, therefore, and for 
explicit recommendation by the police, fully criminalised.52 Interestingly, in advance 
of passing the Act, the intention of the legislature seemed to be that ‘moderate dagga 
smoking is of little importance from the point of view of public order and welfare’, 
and thus, the Act would not be enforced where this kind of moderate smoking was to 
be found.53 
The cultivation of the drug, however, was not made illegal until six years later when 
regulations were legislated in the form of the Medical, Dental and Pharmacy Act 13 of 
192854 to reinforce the prohibition of using or dealing in the so-called ‘habit-forming 
drugs’. This Act extended the powers of the magistrates’ courts, particularly in terms 
 
45 Martin Chanock The Making of South African Legal Culture 1902-1936 (2001) 92. 
46 Crampton op cit note 7 at 6-7; Burchell op cit note 21 at 822; The relevant Acts were the 
Prohibition Ordinance Act 43 in the Orange River Colony and the Dagga Prohibition Ordinance 48 of 
1903 (O) in the Orange Free State.  
47 The Customs and Excise Duties Amendment Act 35 of 1922.  
48 Crampton op cit note 7 at 6-7; Burchell op cit note 21 at 822. 
49 Gerhard Kemp (ed), Shelly Walker, Robin Palmer et al. Criminal Law in South Africa 3 ed (2018) 
488. 
50 Chanock op cit note 45 at 93.  
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid at 94. 
53 Union Archives MM 2372/22: 22/11/21; 12/12/22 as cited in Chanock op cit note 45 at 94. 
54 The Medical, Dental and Pharmacy Act 13 of 1928; Crampton op cit note 7 at 7; Kemp (ed), 




of possible punishment.55 Surprisingly, the term ‘habit-forming drugs’ came up only 
once during the Parliamentary debate and the example mentioned was not even dagga, 
but cocaine.56 It seems, however, as if legislators automatically included dagga among 
these drugs and no one raised an objection to its inclusion. 
The need for the justification to include dagga became obsolete when it was included 
on the international list of ‘habit-forming drugs’.57 The official inclusion had the effect 
that several newspaper articles claiming the harmlessness of the drug were being 
unheard. The issue seemed to be settled, although it actually was not at all.58 
In 1937, the Weeds Act was passed, the process of which again, did not include any 
Parliamentary debate about the term ‘habit-forming drugs’.59 What it did, however, 
was to significantly enhance the power of the police. It also emphasised newly added 
offences to illustrate the drastic nature of this regulation, and according to Paterson, 
‘placed the onus on the occupier or owner of a property to prevent land being used to 
produce dagga, or any other plant declared a “weed” in South Africa. If the occupier 
or owner failed to do so they were guilty of an offence, and furthermore, the 
government was empowered to remove the plant from their land at the owner or 
occupier’s expense.’60 
And still, the harshest piece of legislation was yet to come. In 1971, the Abuse of 
Dependence-producing Substances and Rehabilitation Centres Act 41 of 1971 was 
passed.61 The bill was passed very quickly62 and without significant debate, which 
again suggests consensus and a lack of coherent views or ideas. Burchell supports this 
view, naming growing concern among the population about the increasing use of and 
dealing in dagga as an impetus, particularly seeking stricter legislation.63 But this 
public perception was misled because contrary opinions kept being unheard. The 
General Council of the Bar of South Africa, for example, expressed deep concern, 
especially regarding the fact that there was no consultation of any kind with the legal 
profession before the Act was passed. He further worried about the legal implications 
 
55 Kahn as cited in Crampton op cit note 7 at 7. 
56 Paterson op cit note 4 at 53. 




61 The Abuse of Dependence-producing Substances and Rehabilitation Centres Act 41 of 1971.  
62 Crampton op cit note 7 at 37. 




and stressed ‘the necessity of retaining the fundamental principles of South African 
jurisprudence’.64 The Prime Minister, whom the council turned to, decided, however, 
to ignore this. This, as well as the addition, ‘[…] even in this type of legislation’65, 
shows that the Act, indeed, was seen as significant and even though Parliament passed 
it quickly, there were grounds for further discussion and issues. Engaging more 
closely, it seems possible that the reason for this behaviour was driven by the idea of 
sparing public debate with possible loss of control regarding the outcome. This, 
however, does not appear in the discussion. 
The reasons for the council’s concern, however, are easily comprehensible. The bill 
created three main categories of ‘potentially dangerous dependence-producing drugs’, 
like barbiturates, ‘dangerous dependence-producing drugs’, including cocaine, 
morphine and opium, and ‘prohibited dependence-producing drugs’, which included 
dagga and heroin. The third category was characterised as having no medical value.66 
The punitive jurisdiction was increased in general and the powers of investigation and 
interrogation were expanded.67 Mandatory and extremely lengthy periods of minimum 
imprisonment without any option of a fine came into operation.68 In addition, 
presumptions were made that clearly favoured the state.69 First and foremost, the 
burden of proof was greatly eased for the state, putting it upon the accused, who now, 
contrary to the usual requirements in South African criminal law, had to prove their 
innocence instead of being proven guilty.70 The Act furthermore included new 
regulations, expanding possible offences significantly, such as making it an offence to 
fail to report to the police any suspicion of contraventions of the Act in places of 
entertainment.71 
As a consequence, there was virtually no more debate nor research avenues possible.72 
Particularly concerning was this development in comparison to other countries which 
seemed to be much further in their liberalisation concerning dagga and who continued 
developing towards that opposite direction of South Africa, further relaxing their 
 
64 Kahn as cited in Crampton op cit note 7 at 38. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid at 39.  
67 Crampton op cit note 7 at 7; Kemp (ed), Walker, Palmer et al. op cit note 49 at 488.  
68 Crampton op cit note 7 at 39-40; Compare also Burchell op cit note 21 at 822.  
69 Kemp (ed), Walker, Palmer et al op cit note 49 at 488; Crampton op cit note 7 at 40; Burchell op cit 
note 21 at 822-23. 
70 Crampton op cit note 7 at 40; Burchell op cit note 21 at 822-23.  
71 Kemp (ed), Walker, Palmer et al op cit note 49 at 488.  




regulations.73 A report released by the World Health Organization (WHO) around the 
same time that the Drugs Act was passed,  indeed ‘indicated an association between 
dagga use and minor crimes/anti-social behaviour, but could not find no link between 
dagga use and major crime’.74 At this time, international studies were the only possible 
source for such information. In South Africa, such scientific research was 
unimaginable. 
Finally, in 1992, the 1972 Abuse of Dependence-producing Substances and 
Rehabilitation Centres Act was replaced by the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 
of 1992,75 due to the readmission of South Africa to the United Nations after the 
apartheid era ended. The Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act implemented the United 
Nations Convention against Illicit Drug Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances.76 Apart from some newly introduced regulations regarding trafficking and 
money laundering, however, nothing much changed compared to the legal framework 
which the 1972 Act had established.77   
 
4. What Prince had to face – the legal framework before September 2018  
To cover the years in between, it is best to cite Crampton who claims in her book that 
‘it is no exaggeration then to say that in 2015 South Africa’s drug laws remain virtually 
as draconian as they had been in 1971. And dagga remains the main target against 
which South African drug legislation is directed.’78 Thus, cannabis is still seen as the 
social evil it has been seen as for so long.79  
It is important to engage with the legal framework in more detail. Therefore, it is 
necessary to take a closer look at the specific rules which have been challenged. Within 
this, the relevant Acts of law are the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992 (the 
 
73 Compare how Crampton describes contrary development all over the world in Crampton op cit 
note 7 at 41-3. 
74 Kahn as cited in Crampton op cit note 7 at 43-4.  
75 The Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992. 
76 Burchell op cit note 21 at 823; Kemp (ed), Walker, Palmer et al. op cit note 49 at 489. 
77 Burchell op cit note 21 at 823; Kemp (ed), Walker, Palmer et al. op cit note 49 at 489; Crampton op 
cit note 7 at 45. 





Drugs Act) and the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act 101 of 196580 (the 
Medicines Act).81  
In 2002, Prince challenged section 4(b) of the Drugs Act and section 22A(10) of the 
Medicines Act.  
Section 4(b) of the Drugs Act reads as follows82: 
‘No person shall use or have in his possession— 
(a) […] 
(b) any dangerous dependence-producing substance or any undesirable 
dependence-producing substance, unless— 
(i) he is a patient who has acquired or bought any such substance— 
(aa) […]; or 
(bb) […],  
and uses that substance for medicinal purposes under the care or 
treatment of the said medical practitioner, dentist or practitioner; 
(ii) he has acquired or bought any such substance for medicinal purposes— 
(aa) […]; 
(bb) […]; or 
(cc) […]; 
(iii) he is the Director-General: Welfare who has acquired or bought any such 
substance in accordance with the requirements of the Medicines Act or any 
regulation made thereunder; 
(iv) he, she or it is a patient, medical practitioner, veterinarian, dentist, 
practitioner, nurse, midwife, nursing assistant, pharmacist, veterinary assistant, 
veterinary nurse, manufacturer of, or wholesale dealer in, pharmaceutical 
products, importer or exporter, or any other person contemplated in the 
Medicines Act or any regulation made thereunder, who or which has acquired, 
bought, imported, cultivated, collected or manufactured, or uses or is in 
possession of, or intends to administer, supply, sell, transmit or export any such 
substance in accordance with the requirements or conditions of the said Act or 
regulation, or any permit issued to him, her or it under the said Act or 
regulation; 
(v) he is an employee of a pharmacist, manufacturer of, or wholesale dealer in, 
pharmaceutical products, importer or exporter who has acquired, bought, 
imported, cultivated, collected or manufactured, or uses or is in possession of, 
or intends to supply, sell, transmit or export any such substance in the course 
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of his employment and in accordance with the requirements or conditions of 
the Medicines Act or any regulation made thereunder, or any permit issued to 
such pharmacist, manufacturer of, or wholesale dealer in, pharmaceutical 
products, importer or exporter under the said Act or regulation; or 
(vi) he has otherwise come into possession of any such substance in a lawful 
manner.’ 
To summarise section 4(b), one can say that it prohibits the use as well as the 
possession of cannabis (and any of the other dangerous dependence-producing 
substances) if none of the exceptions apply. 
(The former) Section 22A(10) of the Medicines Act reads as follows83:  
 ‘No person shall— 
(a) acquire, use, have in his possession, manufacture or import any Schedule 8 
substance except for analytical or research purposes and unless a permit for 
such acquisition, use, possession, manufacture or importation has been issued 
to him by the Director-General on the recommendation of the council; or 
(b) acquire, import, collect, cultivate, keep or export any plant or any portion 
thereof from which any such substance can be extracted, derived, produced or 
manufactured, unless a permit to acquire, import, collect, cultivate, keep or 
export such plant or any portion thereof, has been issued to him by the Director-
General on the recommendation of the council.’ 
Cannabis is one of the substances listed in Schedule 8 which is why these prohibitions 
include it as well.   
The more recent High Court and Constitutional Court judgements, which will be 
evaluated in detail below, challenged section 4(b) and 5(b) of the Drugs Act as well as 
section 22A(9)(a)(i) or (10) of the Medicines Act.  
Section 5(b) focuses on the prohibition of dealing in any of these dependence-
producing substances, unless any of the exceptions apply and reads as follows84:  
 ‘No person shall deal in … 
(b) any dangerous dependence-producing substance or any undesirable 
dependence producing substance, unless- 
(i) he has acquired or bought any such substance for medicinal purposes- 
(aa) […]; 
(bb) […]; or 
(cc) […], 
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and administers that substance to a patient or animal under the care or 
treatment of the said medical practitioner, veterinarian, dentist or 
practitioner; 
(ii) he is the Director–General: Welfare who acquires, buys or sells any such 
substance in accordance with the requirements of the Medicines Act or any 
regulation made thereunder; 
(iii) he, she or it is a medical practitioner, veterinarian, dentist, practitioner, 
nurse, midwife, nursing assistant, pharmacist, veterinary assistant, veterinary 
nurse, manufacturer of, or wholesale dealer in, pharmaceutical products, 
importer or exporter, or any other person contemplated in the Medicines Act or 
any regulation made thereunder, who or which prescribes, administers, 
acquires, buys, tranships, imports, cultivates, collects, manufactures, supplies, 
sells, transmits or exports any such substance in accordance with the 
requirements or conditions of the said Act or regulation, or any permit issued 
to him, her or it under the said Act or regulation; or 
(iv) he is an employee of a pharmacists, manufacturer of, or wholesale dealer 
in, pharmaceutical products, importer or exporter who acquires, buys, 
tranships, imports, cultivates, collects, manufactures, supplies, sells, transmits 
or exports any such substance in the course of his employment and in 
accordance with the requirements or conditions of the Medicines Act or any 
regulation made thereunder, or any permit issued to such pharmacists, 
manufacturer of, or wholesale dealer in, pharmaceutical products, importer or 
exporter under the said Act or Regulation.’ 
Thus, this section explicitly prohibits the dealing in dagga unless it includes one of the 
narrowly listed exceptions.  
 
Section 22A(9)(a)(i) of the Medicines Act reads as follows85: 
 ‘No person shall— 
(i) acquire, use, possess, manufacture or supply any Schedule 7 or Schedule 8 
substance, or manufacture any specified Schedule 5 or Schedule 6 substance 
unless he or she has been issued with a permit by the Director-General for such 
acquisition, use, possession, manufacture, or supply: Provided that the 
Director-General may, subject to such conditions as he or she may determine, 
acquire or authorise the use of any Schedule 7 or Schedule 8 substance in order 
to provide a medical practitioner, analyst, researcher or veterinarian therewith 
on the prescribed conditions for the treatment or prevention of a medical 
condition in a particular patient, or for the purposes of education, analysis or 
research.’ 
 
Whereas (nowadays) Section 22A(10) of the Medicines Act reads as follows86: 
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‘Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this section, no person 
shall sell or administer any Scheduled substance or medicine for [any purpose] 
other than medicinal purposes: Provided that the Minister may, subject to the 
conditions or requirements stated in such authority, authorise the 
administration outside any hospital of any Scheduled substance or medicine for 
the satisfaction or relief of a habit or craving to the person referred to in such 
authority.’ 
As Zondo ACJ puts it in the Constitutional Court judgement, ‘when read with Schedule 
7 of GN 509 of 2003 published in terms of section 22A(2) of the Medicines Act, 
section 22A(9)(a)(i) is a prohibition of the acquisition, use, possession, manufacture 
or supply of, among others, cannabis.’87  
Summarising, this subchapter shows how harsh the legal framework still is when it 
comes to dagga. Possible reasons for these draconian regulations shall be discussed 
and evaluated further in the next chapter. 
 
III. Analysis of the punishments – dagga as the black sheep among 
drugs?  
As briefly shown in the previous chapter, punishments for the use and possession of 
dagga are harsh. This chapter will have a closer look at the punishments themselves 
that were implemented by the Drugs Act of 199288 and its predecessor – the 
Dependence-producing Substances and Rehabilitation Centres Act 41 of 1971.89 It is 
also important to compare the punishments to the sentences in relation to other drugs. 
This chapter will not only show the imbalance of treatment between different drugs 
but also ask for the why, the official as well as the unofficial reasoning, behind these 
strict punishments.   
Various possible reasons as well as their particular impact on forming these rigorous 
laws, will be evaluated. After outlining the prevailing imbalance of punishments, the 
focus will be on the possible reasons which, over time, have repeatedly been 
mentioned in diverse (scientific) publications and have thus become more or less 
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common arguments. These reasons to be evaluated are youth protection, medical 
reasons, and racism.  
 
1. Story of an inappropriate imbalance  
To summarise the findings made above, currently the legal basis to punish a person for 
using dagga or dealing in it is regulated in the Drugs Act of 1992 and the Medicines 
Act of 1965.90 But in order to understand the punishments in light of their development 
and changes that were made (or not made), it is useful to briefly engage with the 1971 
Act.  
The 1971 Act, whose penalties were ‘intended to be severe’,91 was already heavily 
criticised before it came into force.92 The introduction of harsh punishments is 
assumed to be connected to previously rapidly increasing numbers of dagga offences.93 
Still, even an authority in the form of the Department of Social Welfare raised the 
question of whether increasing fines and imprisonment periods would be the most 
effective way to fight the numerous offences.94 The Department suggested 
investigating the real causes of the issue through an exhaustive study.95 Theron picks 
up on this thought in his thesis, saying that the increased offences were fundamentally 
a social problem to which authorities have responded with draconian measures. He 
sees severe punishments, especially if implemented for first offenders, as a danger due 
to them being stigmatising and (unfair) labelling.96  
The Drugs Act of 1992 forms new categories of ‘dependence-producing substances’, 
‘dangerous dependence-producing substances’ and ‘undesirable dependence-
producing substances’. Dagga is listed in Part III, and thus, is part of the undesirable 
dependence-producing substances. The range of possible punishments includes 
imposing a fine, imprisonment, and both a fine and imprisonment. The amount of the 
possible fine is to be determined by the presiding officer. Concerning the 
imprisonment periods, up to 15 years are possible for the use of dagga and up to 25 
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years for dealing in the drug. Particularly bearing in mind that the sale of dagga often 
constitutes the only source of income for many dealers, imprisonment of up to 25 years 
seems to be unbearably harsh. And it is part of the reality that even small-time dealers 
go to jail for their offences, many of them leaving as hardened criminals.97  
At first, supporters of legalising or decriminalising dagga might regard the 
classification of dagga as being an 'undesirable dependence-producing substance’ and 
not a ‘dangerous dependence-producing substance’ as a good thing. In former 
classifications, as shown above, it was indeed categorised as part of the more 
dangerous substances. This change of classification therefore could be seen as an 
achievement in terms of softening its status within the legal framework. However, it 
becomes clear that in fact, it does not make any difference. Admittedly, being 
classified as ‘undesirable’ sounds better and less harmful than being officially labelled 
as ‘dangerous’. Still, both categories fall within the same range of punishments. The 
Act effectively only distinguishes between ‘dependence-producing substances’ on the 
one hand and ‘dangerous dependence-producing substances’ as well as ‘undesirable 
dependence-producing substances’ on the other hand. Further, dagga still finds itself 
to be in the same group of substances as Methamphetamine and Heroin, which was 
also one of the main critiques of the Act of 1971.98 Alcohol, however, to which 
Minnaar compares dagga in order to explain what is meant by ‘undesirable’, is not 
listed at all, and thus is not considered as being part of any of those groups.99  
At the same time, the development of the legal framework to become stricter not only 
bears various absurdities within itself and in relation to the number of criminal 
offences, but also with regard to the general global trend. In 2015, Minnaar raised the 
issue that many countries in the world are moving towards the decriminalisation of 
certain drugs which are perceived as less harmful, such as dagga, while they are 
inflexibly strict with harder drugs such as heroin. This is a trend that has been 
completely ignored by the South African authorities where these substances are still 
treated as equally dangerous and harmful.100   
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To conclude this section, the legal development proves itself to be inconsistent and 
inappropriate. This leaves us with the assumption that there must have been other 
reasons for the legislature to allow for such harsh punishments. Some reasons that 
possibly had an impact will be evaluated in the following subchapters.  
 
2. Medical reasons for justifying harsh punishments?  
One possibility in terms of these other reasons seems to be that there are medical 
reasons justifying the harsh punishments. It is important to evaluate the different 
sources according to the time they were written in and with respect to the standard of 
scientific knowledge at the time of publication. What was once a scientific fact may 
by now have been proven to be wrong. 
At this time, the use of dagga and its medical effects have not been fully explored, 
regarding both the mental and the physical effects.101 What seems to be certain, 
however, is that the effects differ significantly from one person to another and even 
for the same person on different occasions. These differences can also, but not 
exclusively, depend on variables such as the method and amount of consumption.102 
Yet, medical reasons are frequently discussed when it comes to the question of if, and 
how, to punish the use, possession, and cultivation of dagga. For that reason alone, we 
need to further explore them as a possible reasoning behind the severity of the 
penalties.  
Starting in the late 19th century, the idea of cannabis causing insanity was spread and 
adopted by the British colonies.103 The first publications were written by the 
government in South Africa, raising the concern that dagga caused insanity, 
particularly amongst the ‘natives’ in India; these concerns were claimed to be well-
researched.104 Further, there were other very detailed descriptions of how indentured 
Indian workers’ abilities markedly decreased due to the use of dagga.105 Concerning 
these descriptions, however, it is not clear which can really be proven and which are 
fabricated and altered and passed on from one person to another.106 It seems that a lot 
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of those ‘findings’ were based on the interpretation of other stories and concocted, 
depending on how they fitted into the bigger picture. Conclusions were drawn from 
circumstantial evidence at best. And then, they were spread under the umbrella of 
scientific research. Similar descriptions, however, can be found regarding labourers in 
the Cape in the early 20th century.107  
But the most shocking aspect was that the Natal Indian Immigrants Commission, 
responsible for most of the publications at this time, was not even concerned about the 
people or dagga causing insanity. Their main concern was how dagga had a negative 
impact on their workers’ work performance and was a trigger for violence.108 This 
shows that those quasi-scientific reasons for the upcoming concern regarding dagga 
did not even circle around the health of their labourers but only on the employers’ own 
economic well-being.  
In the early 20th century, the first systematic investigation regarding the effects of 
dagga was published by C.J.G. Bourhill in the form of a thesis he submitted to the 
University of Edinburgh.109 It concentrated on the use of dagga among the natives of 
South Africa and claimed to evaluate the findings in a scientific manner. His findings 
showed that dagga played a crucial role in producing ‘dagga insanity’110 as well as 
other types of insanity such as schizophrenia, dementias and manic depressive and 
delusional psychoses. Continuing, he clarifies that dagga is not likely to be the only 
cause for these insanities but is only one important factor adding to the ‘causal trinity 
– environment, nidus and vice’.111 
In his thesis, Paterson’s extensive engagement with Bourhill’s study shows that those 
medical findings, at least from today’s perspective, are nothing but ostensible.112 They 
bare profound racist ideologies hiding under the cover of quasi biological reasoning. 
And yet, Bourhill’s views were widely spread and highly esteemed. They represented 
the state of both the scientific and official debate at that time.113 Thus, they were 
assumed to be accurate scientific data that is dangerous for both the individual and 
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society due to causing insanity. Contrary views and lines of argumentation, which also 
already existed during this time, were ignored. Adopting this perspective, Bourhill’s 
findings, which raised medical concerns, could be an explanation, or at least part of it, 
of why harsh laws were introduced, even though it took nearly 60 more years until the 
Dependence-producing Substances Act of 1971 was introduced. 
Theodore James, publishing many of his articles regarding cannabis around 1970, had 
already discussed that the lack of first-hand clinical assessments were a barrier to a 
profound critical evaluation.114 He also emphasises the disagreement amongst scholars 
regarding the question of dagga being harmful or not.115 In his thesis, written in 1974, 
Theron further raises the issue of the lack of investigation into dagga. He quotes the 
Department stating that ‘it is generally accepted that the use of dagga causes 
psychological dependence’.116 At the same time, he criticises the lack of investigation 
into dagga smoking, and thus, brings up the question of why dagga was characterised 
as a prohibited dependence-producing substance in terms of the Dependence-
producing Substances Act of 1971. In his view, the inclusion was not based on enough 
evidence.117 This shows that there were indeed other, highly educated, voices 
challenging the official view. However, there is no evidence that these voices were 
heard, or that they were included in any debates.  
Today, dagga and its effects are, at least, better known than in the 1970s. What we 
know now, however, nearly exclusively focuses on chronic heavy dagga use by 
habitual users, meaning those who smoke on a daily basis.118 Within this group of 
users, dagga is believed to increase the symptoms of chronic bronchitis, cause impaired 
respiratory function, cancer, and cardio-vascular disease,  decrease resistance to 
infection, lower testosterone secretion, and sperm production as well as disrupt the 
ovulatory cycle in females.119 In terms of behaviour, smoking cannabis very heavily 
can lead to more distinct cognitive impairment, confusion, amnesia, delusions, 
hallucinations, anxiety, and agitation as well as schizophrenia.120 But again, these 
consequences only concern habitual users smoking every day over a long period of 
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time. This type of smoking increases various risks but does not definitely lead to any 
of the above-mentioned diseases and impairments. Recreational, and thus occasional, 
use, on the other hand, does not cause these particular risks if not for those smoking 
during adolescence and young adulthood.121  
Modern studies do not show a connection between the recreational use of dagga and 
violent or aggressive behaviour.122 Therefore, this connection, as declared in past 
studies, is to be refuted. Even the World Health Organization report of 1971 supports 
the finding that drinking alcohol, which is widely accepted in society, is more likely 
to lead to violence than smoking dagga.123 
Nowadays, supporters of a change of categorisation of dagga and moderation of the 
laws or even decriminalisation of the herb base their arguments in particular on 
comparisons to legal drugs such as alcohol, caffeine, and tobacco. They do this to put 
dagga into the same context as legal substances which, in some circumstances, have a 
more lethal effect. Thus, it seems that they try to demonstrate how dagga is relatively 
harmless for adult users, unless smoked excessively.  
One of the biggest fears surrounding dagga still seems to be the issue of dagga probably 
being a gate-way drug.124 This means that people, especially of a rather young age, 
start with smoking dagga and end up being addicted to more harmful and dangerous 
drugs such as heroin or morphine. Although there is no proof in the form of a direct 
connection between dagga and dangerous drugs to be found for this theory yet, it is a 
common part of anti-decriminalisation argumentation.125   
What will not be evaluated in any detail here is the wide-ranging medicinal use of 
dagga which also bares uncountable advantages. This would go beyond the scope of 
this thesis and has already been exhaustively assessed by various scholars.126 
Concluding, one can say that the discussion regarding the effects and medical risks of 
dagga lacks research. In 1974, Theron already suggested the ambiguity regarding 
dagga’s medical effects to be crucial for the hesitation in terms of a possible 
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legalisation of dagga.127 This thought ignores the official position on dagga during that 
time, namely that it is very harmful to an individual’s health. The scientific findings 
constituting the official view, however, were probably mostly driven by a profoundly 
racist ideology and it seems that contrary opinions were not heard. Thus, medical fears 
and ambiguity could indeed have been a reason for the harsh laws that came into force, 
although the line of argument would have lacked stringency, even at that time. At least 
today, we have enough scientific foundation to certainly say that dagga is by far not as 
dangerous as was estimated in the 20th century. With all that we know, medical reasons 
cannot justify such harsh punishment, at least not standing by themselves. They indeed 
could form part of a whole consistent line of argument based on different reasons. But 
at the end of the day, I have to say that they do not seem to be enough to still uphold 
such draconian laws. 
 
3. The argument of youth protection  
Having drawn the conclusion that medical reasons might be part of the argumentation 
providing the basis for harsh laws, but that they are not likely to justify them on their 
own, it is necessary to consider further possible reasons. Another one could lie in the 
argument of youth protection.   
Paterson engages with The Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on the Abuse 
of Dagga (RICAD) from 1952. He claims that dagga abuse by youths used to be tightly 
connected with lack of occupancy and supervision.128 Nearly twenty years later, just 
prior to the implementation of the Dependence-producing Substances Act of 1971, Dr 
Mulder stated at Stellenbosch University that ‘[w]e dare not let hundreds of young 
lives be sacrificed on this modern altar of self-destruction’.129 He referred to the 
Hippie-movement of the 1960s and 70s, when many young people were seen as 
especially vulnerable in terms of dagga abuse. For the first time, the discussion focused 
on white youths too, who were rebelling against their parents and smoking dagga 
heavily.130 This development might have justified the call for more youth protection 
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with stricter laws in order to gain more control. Still, the laws were not only directed 
at the youth but also at every mature person, being part of the target group. Because of 
this, it seems questionable whether youth protection had the most significant impact. 
In addition, the argument used to implement such draconian laws for the protection of 
young people is not very convincing.  
More recent studies show that dagga use ranks second to alcohol and that this use is 
particularly alarming among young people between the age of 13 and 19. Within this 
age group, the use is five to ten percent higher than amongst adults.131 Further, when 
smoking dagga heavily at a relatively young age, the risk of not finishing high school 
and experiencing instability in later jobs increases.132 Also, the medical risks, as 
already mentioned above, are much higher when abusing dagga in adolescence. 
Particularly concerning psychological disorders, connections can be drawn to cannabis 
abuse at a relatively young age.133 Taking these findings seriously, they might provide 
a sufficient basis to uphold the strict laws we have. In other words, if the argument of 
youth protection was not enough to introduce the laws, it might be enough to maintain 
them at the present time.  
Countering this thought, it is important to note that even today youth protection occurs 
more as a supporting argument. It cannot be founded as the leading reasoning in 
justifying the harsh dagga laws, as there does not seem to be any focus on it. 
Additionally, it would make more sense to actually target the youth if protecting them 
was the primary purpose. But the laws are written and executed for everyone, of all 
ages. This argument clearly shows that youth protection cannot be the main goal 
behind them.  
Concluding, youth protection has the potential of being the main reasoning behind the 
strict laws as medical and social findings show. But considering how the laws are 
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4. Dagga as a non-white problem?  
With the unsatisfactory findings made in the previous subchapters, it is obvious that 
there must be at least one other (main) reason why the government has had to impose 
and maintain such harsh laws. Another thesis, which will be proven to be 
overwhelmingly significant and correct, is that the main reasoning behind the laws 
concerning dagga is racism. Dagga has been demonised by white governments for a 
long time. It was seen as a non-white problem and experienced racialised prohibition.  
It is safe to say that colonialism was founded on a hierarchy of colour.134 The 
colonialists expected other ‘racial’ groups to be useful to them; their doing was 
oriented for their own protection, at the expense of others.135 At the same time, the 
interaction between the different ‘races’ was kept to a minimum. The fears of the 
colonialists regarding dagga were wide-ranging. And yet, during these times, up until 
the 20th century, they can be broadly categorised into the fear of insanity, labourer 
indolence, violence, and degeneration.136 The white community connected the 
indolence of their labourers to smoking dagga instead of looking for other reasons such 
as poor nutrition, poor medical care or poor living conditions.137 Blacks and Coloureds 
were considered to be more ‘primitive’ than the white ruling class, and thus, more 
‘savage’.138 Paterson describes the general idea as follows: ‘if criminals were like 
savages, then all savages were potential criminals’.139 This view, as well as the idea 
that dagga would enforce inner, bad character traits, was heavily loaded with racial 
prejudice, although it was not seen like this at the time. Or even if it was, such prejudice 
was deemed acceptable. The colonists' ideology of a natural hierarchy was supported 
by the quasi-scientific research at this time, as already described above. Especially 
Charles Darwin, who today is best known for his contribution to the science of 
evolution, planted and watered this ideology with the studies he published at the end 
of the 19th century.140 All of this led to the recommendation that dagga be prohibited.141  
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Presumably, above all stood the fear of contact between the different racial groups, 
leading to moral degeneration and a break of the cultural norms of the white 
community.142 Non-whites such as the Khoikhoi, Xhosa, and San were seen as inferior 
to the white colonialists. Since dagga was presumed to lower self-control, the ruling-
class was afraid that (non-white) dagga users would breach the barriers they 
constructed between the groups.143 Hence, this might have a negative impact on the 
members of such presumed higher order, so the fear that this would lead to their moral 
degeneration.  
These descriptions show the increasing racialisation in various sectors of society. 
Already at the end of the 19th century, these racist views had climbed to new heights. 
Dagga, admittedly rarely smoked by the white population, was widely seen as a non-
white problem only. The white population mostly associated it with those racial groups 
they considered to be inferior. Therefore, it was important to them to create and keep 
a clear distance between these groups of different backgrounds, especially between 
themselves as a supposedly superior group, and the inferior groups comprised of other 
races. Hence, the motivation for prohibiting dagga was to be found in the colonists’ 
benefit from exploiting other racial groups, while maintaining a presumably safe 
distance, and thus, minimising the threat originating from these. In other words, the 
colonists did not want to renounce the advantages which exploiting other racial groups 
gave them but wanted to preserve a certain distance between them so as not to 
degenerate themselves. The threat they saw in the dagga usage of other groups was to 
be kept at a distance.  
Then, by 1921, a real panic arose concerning the use of dagga and the threat it 
constituted to the white ruling class.144 Since this needed to be controlled, it is 
interesting to see how the demonisation of dagga correlated with increasing systematic 
racial discrimination and new upcoming laws within the next decades, building the 
foundation for the latter apartheid era.145 Criminalising dagga was, therefore, an 
important step in maintaining and even expanding the divide between the different 
groups populating South Africa.   
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These fears were also heavily influenced by the criminological thinking at that time 
and its pseudo-scientific basis.146 The targets of criminal investigation were generally 
found amongst blacks, coloureds, and poor whites, in other words, marginalised 
groups according to the understanding of the white upper class.147 Criminality, not 
only regarding dagga, was assumed to be ‘infectious’ and ‘spread from lower races to 
higher’.148 Comments such as ‘[t]he Native view that there is nothing reprehensible 
about dagga-smoking in itself, as distinct from smoking to excess which is frowned 
upon, has not been changed by the fact that the law of the white man now forbids the 
practice’149 demonstrate vividly how racial tensions and feelings of being superior to 
other groups defined the tone. Publications with chapters headed ‘Crime in Relation 
to Race and Nativity’150 or ‘The Negro and Crime’151 are more examples of the 
pervading atmosphere. It also shows that the general idea in terms of criminology was 
a question of race, and not only concerning cannabis. 
When Apartheid became consolidated, these developments were also further 
entrenched. Dagga was still firmly linked to the underclass.152 But since Apartheid 
officially introduced a hierarchy between different racial groups and separated these 
wherever possible, the direct connection between dagga and the separation of those 
groups established a certain fear as well. The government was afraid dagga could 
encourage political discontent and protest.153 In a similar development earlier that 
century, the white ruling class feared a breach of the separation of racial groups. They 
were worried that breaking dagga laws could easily lead to also breaking Apartheid 
laws.154 Thus, dagga became more and more of a threat to the all-white government 
and its establishment. This was supported by the fact that dagga was still very suitable 
for the masses and its use was widely spread. It, therefore, needed to be even more 
controlled. 
In 1952, the Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on the Abuse of Dagga 
(RICAD) was published.155 It set the tone and initiated discussions for several decades 
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from that year onwards.156 Already in the preamble to the first chapter of the report, it 
was basically stated that dagga was assumed to be a non-white problem.157 This 
reflected the view and ideology of the apartheid establishment, while contrary studies 
or ideas did not find their way into the report.158 Thus,  the commission which 
published the report was supposed to work in a certain way, as it had a racialised 
mandate.159 As Paterson puts it, the report seemed ‘to reflect an attempt to reconcile 
the deracialised social sciences of the post-war years with the increasingly racialised 
politics of the newly established apartheid state’.160 In terms of dagga, the commission 
found that it was presumed to be the least dangerous of habit-forming drugs and that 
when it was smoked in moderation, the effects were not serious.161 They even 
concluded that it might be no more harmful than smoking tobacco.162 And yet, the 
commission did an about-face on the very same page of its report, returning to 
previously stated arguments concerning the great dangers of overindulgence, as if to 
refute its own initial conclusions.163 It also emphasised that dagga indeed would 
produce moral degeneration.164 Since this reasoning does not seem very conclusive 
and there seems no plausible reason for it, the actual motive behind it might be racism. 
Dagga was referred to as ‘the evil’165 in an attempt to maintain the fear of it. A new 
term introduced in the report was ‘respectability’ which was also linked to the use of 
dagga in a way that the use of dagga was thought to lead to decreasing respectability.166 
This, however, was again solely connected to non-whites. Hence, the thinking of racial 
hierarchies was further entrenched with new figures. In general, this ideology was 
covered but not openly stated.167 But still, these views are the only ones that were 
included in the report. Another argument supporting this is that Bourhill’s thesis, 
which has been evaluated above, was not only used by the commission but exclusively 
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reprinted for it.168 The outcome of the report was the recommendation of almost 
draconian laws.169  
In the 1960s and 1970s, dagga politics experienced significant changes due to the 
hippie movement arising. Suddenly, white middle-class youth started using dagga.170 
It seems possible that now that their own children were smoking dagga, the 
establishment focused on protecting them instead of solely oppressing other racial 
groups. This could even be seen as a reason behind the harsh Act introduced in 1971. 
And in a way it was true, namely that whites wanted to protect their youth. But instead 
of fearing negative medical effects, this wish had other causes. The real reasoning 
behind presumably necessary protection was based on the old fear of cannabis usage 
leading to degeneration. In other words, white people wanted to protect themselves 
from losing control and degenerating, as, in their opinion, were non-white dagga 
users.171 This reasoning is profoundly racist and contemptuous. At the same time, the 
use of dagga became a statement for political activism and radicalism; it was linked to 
opposing the establishment.172 Its use was seen as an expression of scorn for the law.173 
Thus, seeing their authority being endangered, the apartheid state made the prohibition 
of dagga part of their political agenda.174 For the first time, this was not only directed 
against non-white racial groups but also white middle-class kids who were challenging 
Apartheid South Africa. Therefore, these developments can at least be seen as being 
part of the harsh legislation implemented in 1971.  
Although this last paragraph shows that it was not all about disguised racism, most of 
the given legislation was.  In general, dagga was seen as a problem and as endangering 
the claim to power by the white colonists. Different racial groups being in close contact 
and mixing was to be prevented by all means. The prohibition of dagga through such 
harsh measures was supposed to secure control and separation. The outcome was that 
deeply racist laws were designed to oppress racial groups other than the white ruling 
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5. Conclusion  
As evaluated in this chapter, we cannot claim, as yet, to fully understand dagga nor 
know about its impact without exception.175 Besides the reasons mentioned above, the 
lack of research might also have supported the emergence of draconian dagga laws. 
When James pointed out the small number of first-hand clinical observations, he 
demonstrated how Bourhill’s pseudo-scientific work lacked sufficient research to 
provide scientifically solid proof.176 And as time passed and the laws became stricter, 
the situation concerning the drug did not change for the positive. The significance of 
dagga increased, correlating to many articles and bodies of research until, in the 1970s, 
a decline of articles was experienced. If this was due to the harsh new laws or if the 
laws were implemented due to the former increasing amount of research, is indeed 
hard to say.  
Dagga was made illegal so that any research on it was severely curtailed, or was 
deemed illegal too,177 as dagga had a stigma attached to it.178 And because of too little 
research on the herb regarding both, the positive as well as the negative effects,179 it 
remained unknown and feared.180 Interestingly, this development occurred in contrast 
to many other countries, where dagga  continued to be investigated.181 Hence, it would 
not be surprising if a lot of the fear concerning dagga came from too little research. In 
addition to the significant reasons evaluated above, this reason can, therefore, be seen 
as a legitimate cause for the laws remaining so strict for the past 50 years.   
Dagga is indeed the black sheep amongst drugs, with punishments being 
disproportionately severe for various reasons. These different reasons go hand in hand, 
led by pure racism. As already said in the famous Dagga-couple case and the campaign 
which followed, today’s laws ‘are unjust, irrational and based on outdated propaganda. 
These laws are rooted in our colonial past and its racist agenda.’182 
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IV. Times are changing – the period of decriminalisation has begun 
The legal situation described above has experienced massive changes due to two recent 
court judgements that partially decriminalise dagga. The first of these landmark 
judgements is the High Court ruling Prince v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development and Others; Rubin v National Director of Public Prosecutions and 
Others; Acton and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others183 
(hereafter referred to as Prince II.1) handed down in March 2017 which implemented 
the partial decriminalisation and was confirmed by the Constitutional Court in Minister 
of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others v Prince (Clarke and Others 
Intervening); National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others v Rubin; National 
Director of Public Prosecutions and Others v Acton184 (hereafter referred to as Prince 
II.2) in September 2018. 
Because of the great impact these decisions have had on the legal development 
regarding cannabis, they will be summarised as well as discussed in more detail within 
this chapter. In order to comprehensively understand the reasoning behind the partial 
decriminalisation of dagga, it is also important to consider the case of Prince v 
President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope (CCT36/00) [2002] ZACC 1; 
2002 (2) SA 794; 2002 (3) BCLR 231185 (hereafter referred to as Prince I) decided in 
2002 which, to a certain degree, paved the way for the decriminalisation to be 
implemented years later.  
 
1. Prince I  
In Prince I from 2002, Garreth Prince, a South African Rastafarian, applied to be 
admitted as an attorney. Within the process of application, he disclosed two previous 
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convictions for possessing dagga. With cannabis being part of his religion, he also 
stated that he intended to continue the use of such.186  The applicant argued that certain 
provisions, especially of the Drugs Act of 1992187 and the Medicines Act of 1965188, 
conflicted with his constitutional right to freedom of religion. His focus was on the use 
and possession of dagga, not on trading it. The Constitutional Court saw section 4(b) 
of the Drugs Act of 1992 and section 22A of the Medicines Act of 1965 as relevant 
and considered their constitutionality with regard to the freedom of religion and, in the 
end, held that the ‘general prohibition against possession or use of drugs is a reasonable 
and justifiable limitation’ on such in terms of section 36 of the Constitution.189 
Nonetheless, this case should go down in history as one of the best-known attempts to 
(partially) decriminalise dagga, although the main focus was linked to freedom of 
religion. Even though Prince failed in his application, this case once again drew 
attention to the issue of the potential decriminalisation/legalisation of dagga.190  
It certainly also inspired new attempts and possible reasons for justifying 
decriminalisation. One example of this can be directly drawn from the judgements 
themselves. Interestingly, especially with the background knowledge of the latter court 
rulings partially decriminalising dagga for private use,191 Sachs J had already used the 
term ‘private use’ of dagga, describing the threat posed by this kind of use by the 
Rastafarian as ‘particularly harmless’.192 Gerhard Kemp, Professor of Law at 
Stellenbosch University and criminal law author, however, also published his thoughts 
on the possible decriminalisation of dagga and is now proven to have been wrong in 
his assumption that it has to be the Parliament, and not the courts, that will provide 
South Africa with a more liberal policy in terms of dagga.193 And yet, Kemp 
categorised Prince I to be part of the way ‘towards the decriminalisation of the use of 
dagga’, an assumption in which he was correct.194 195 
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2. Prince II.1 – High Court  
The relevant High Court decision is Prince II.1 with judgment handed down in 2017. 
Departing from 2002, in this case, Prince (the applicant), did not focus on religion. The 
biggest difference presumably is that in 2017 he was not seeking an exception to the 
existing legal framework in order to be allowed to use and possess dagga for religious 
means like in his first case. He did not want the (rather small) group of Rastafarians 
being treated differently to the rest of society not believing in Rastafarianism. Instead, 
he now focused on questioning the lawfulness of the regulations, in particular section 
4(b) and 5(b) of the Drugs Act of 1992 and section 22A of the Medicines Act of 1965, 
especially with regard to their alleged inconsistency with section 14 of the 
Constitution. Judge Davis framed the challenge as focusing on ‘the extent to which 
laws that prohibit the use of cannabis and the possession, purchase, and cultivation 
thereof for personal consumption exclusively are valid’196. Thus, this case was not 
about religious exceptions but about the right of privacy which is highly protected by 
the Constitution.  
In the chronology of the application, the reasoning emphasised the social importance 
as well as the complexity of the question to be solved.197 This shows that during the 
entire process of the decision making, the court had been perfectly aware of the wide 
scope and importance of its decision. The argumentation is careful and always backs 
up the statements made, be it in comparison to other decisions or in awareness of the 
separation of powers which is set out very clearly.198 There obviously was put a lot of 
effort into writing this judgment to provide a consistent base on which to uphold the 
court’s decision.   
Describing the applicants' causes more precisely and breaking them down into three 
major points, the reasoning showed a lot of goodwill. The court summarised the 
applicants' objectives to the argumentation 'that the criminal prohibition of the use and 
possession of cannabis in their [the applicants] own homes and "properly designated 
places" was unconstitutional' and that especially 'fundamental rights such as equality, 
dignity, and freedom of religion were breached',199 whereas the court itself saw the 
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main issue as the right to privacy.200 It also explicitly dealt with another argument 
made by the applicants, focusing on the distinction between dagga and other harmful 
substances as being irrational and unjustifiable in terms of section 36(1) of the 
Constitution.201 This is only one of the various paragraphs in the judgement where one 
gets the impression that the court wanted to make a change through this judgement and 
its reasoning, and where it seems to really want to rule in favour of the applicants.202  
At the beginning of the judgment, the court engaged with the first Prince judgement 
from 2002, especially with the minority judgement of Ngcobo J, in which a limited 
exemption for religious reasons was approved.203 But since this former judgement  
exclusively dealt with religious reasons, Davis J did not see it as applicable in this 
case.204 Still, he explained Ngcobo’s reasons in detail and, after stating that the core is 
‘whether the infringement of the right to privacy caused by the impugned legislation 
can be justified in terms of s 36 of the Constitution’,205 he focused on the right to 
privacy.  
The right to privacy is guaranteed by section 14 of the Constitution and on citing 
Ackerman J,206 one can see that Davis J wanted to emphasise the importance of the 
right to privacy’s constitutional protection. He also drew links between the right to 
privacy and the right to dignity as well as between the right to privacy and the right to 
freedom,207 stating that the need for protection of the right to privacy would depend on 
how intimate the relevant personal sphere was.208 He then focused on the question of 
limitation, asking if the legislative framework constitutes limitations on the right to 
privacy,209 followed by the question as to if those limitations were reasonable and 
justifiable in terms of section 36 of the Constitution.210 The judgment included the 
question of racism, coming to the conclusion that ‘this brief recourse to history is 
reflective of the manifestly impermissible racist and moralistic justifications used for 
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correspond with the findings of the previous chapter of this very thesis. Ultimately, the 
reasoning behind the harsh criminalisation of dagga was likely to be driven by racist 
ideologies and moralistic pseudo justifications. Saying it this clearly, the judge took a 
bold step towards an ironclad justification of the decriminalisation of dagga. 
Within the same paragraph, the court then again linked this question of racism to the 
issue of privacy, which it had already dealt with before. In his view, an infringement 
of such an important right must fulfil high standards, which are not met by ‘private 
moral views of a section of a community’.212 In other words, he briefly says that in 
terms of justification regarding section 36, the right to privacy would be more 
important and worthy of protection than the private moral views of only a few. These 
views would therefore not qualify as the legitimation of infringing such a significant 
right.213  
Continuing, the judgement dealt with the effects of dagga on one’s health with the 
basic outcome that, according to the medical record included by the judge, dagga 
would not cause harm when used in small amounts.214 Many of the risks and problems 
were found to be linked to heavy and abusive use. Hence, any harm caused by dagga 
was seen to be dose-related. If not overdone, dagga was found not to be detrimental at 
all.215 
Davis J’s judgement engaged in detail with cases from other countries, using 
comparative law as persuasive. The first case he cited is R v Malmo-Levine; R v 
Caine216, decided by the Canadian Supreme Court, where the judge linked the right to 
privacy to individual behaviour in private settings.217 In the Argentinian Supreme of 
Justice Arriola218 ruling, Article 14 of the Argentinian Drug Control Legislation was 
found unconstitutional due to an invasion of the sphere of personal liberty. Thus 
possession of cannabis for personal consumption was decriminalised in the case that 




214 Ibid para 35-61. 
215 Ibid para 61. 
216 R v Malmo-Levine; R v Caine [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, 2003 SCC 74, available at: https://scc-
csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/2109/index.do, accessed on 11 March 2020.  
217 Prince II.1 supra note 183 para 73. 
218 Arriola, Sebastián y otros s/ causa n° 9080, available at: 
http://sjconsulta.csjn.gov.ar/sjconsulta/documentos/verDocumentoByIdLinksJSP.html?idDocumento
=6711401&cache=1584358392584, accessed on 16 March 2020.  




possession of marijuana at home, based on the right to privacy and denial of the state’s 
intrusion, in Ravin v State of Alaska220.221 The Supreme Court of Mexico had to deal 
with almost the same issue, concluding similarly.222 Drawing his conclusion in respect 
to the comparative law, Davis J found that significant changes in courts and legislation 
regarding personal consumption were taking place, reflecting ‘a clear shift in a 
consensus in what can be considered to be open and democratic societies, that the 
criminalisation and possession of cannabis for personal use is no longer effective in 
preventing harm. In short, there is no longer a consensus that can regard such 
limitations as justifiable.’223 The personal view of the judge gets very clear here. He 
feels that under the circumstances of several countries changing their laws towards 
decriminalising the use of dagga, he cannot rule in any other way other than also 
declaring laws which prohibit personal use in private as unconstitutional. This 
conclusion might seem fairly bold, especially with respect to its severity and alleged 
duress. Despite the fact that Davis J lists many countries as having softened their laws 
regarding the personal consumption of dagga,224 it would be an overstatement to say 
that every open and democratic society has gone this way. Hence, saying that a 
decision cannot be made differently these days and that there is no consensus to be 
found that such limitations can be justifiable, goes too far. Nevertheless, the empirical 
data of this judgement shows that more and more countries are indeed altering their 
laws, taking a more liberal approach in terms of the private use of dagga. Therefore, 
Davis J joins the decisionmakers making these changes possible, regardless of the 
motivation behind his ruling nor the pressure he felt to rule this way. 
Coming to his evaluation, the judge was not convinced by the evidence presented by 
the respondents, naming it ‘unimpressive’225 and finding that the respondents were not 
able to discharge the burden placed upon them.226 
Concluding in a long argument and summing up reasons,227 the court came to a 
conclusion and ordered as follows: 
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‘1. The following provisions are declared inconsistent with the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 and invalid, only to the extent 
that they prohibit the use of cannabis by an adult in private dwellings where 
the possession, purchase or cultivation of cannabis for personal consumption 
by an adult: 
1.1. sections 4(b) and 5(b) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 
of 1992 (the Drugs Act) read with Part III of Schedule 2 to the Drugs 
Act; and 
1.2. section 22A(9)(a)(i) of the Medicines and Related Substances 
Control Act 101 of 1965 (the Medicines Act) and s 22A (10) thereof 
read with schedule 7 of GN R509 of 2003 published in terms of s 
22A(2) of the Medicines Act. 
2. This declaration of invalidity is suspended for a period of 24 months from 
the date of this judgment in order to allow Parliament to correct the defects as 
set out in this judgment. 
3. It is declared that until Parliament has made the amendments contemplated 
in paragraph 1 or the period of suspension has expired, it will be deemed to be 
a defence to a charge under a provision as set out in paragraph 1 of this order 
that the use, possession, purchase or cultivation of cannabis in a private 
dwelling is for the personal consumption of the adult accused.’228 
 
With this decision, Davis J made the first big step towards the partial decriminalisation 
of dagga in South Africa which was approved by the Constitutional Court one year 
later. Engaging with his judgment and with how carefully it is backed up, it is clear 
that Davis J considered it a landmark decision.  
 
3. Prince II.2 – Constitutional Court  
The relevant Constitutional Court decision is Prince II.2 from 18th September 2018. 
Zondo ACJ, who wrote the (unanimous) judgement, mostly confirmed the High 
Court’s judgement from March 2017. The biggest departure is the distinction between 
the use, possession, and cultivation of dagga on the one hand – where he confirmed 
the judgement – and purchasing (dealing in) dagga on the other hand – where he did 
not confirm the High Court’s judgement. He also refrained from using the term ‘private 
dwellings’ but ordered the use of ‘in private’ or ‘in private places’ instead. The period 
of suspension of 24 months was confirmed, although he stressed that the High Court 
was neither competent nor was it necessary for it to grant such an order.229 Briefly, one 
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can say that this Constitutional Court judgement narrowed the High Court judgement 
down to some extent, through only partially confirming it. Still, it held up the most 
significant orders, so that, overall, the judgment still favoured the respondents of this 
case. Being aware of what confirmatory proceedings mean,230 Zondo ACJ sought to 
find an answer to the Constitutional Court’s issue, ‘whether the impugned provisions 
limit the right to privacy as held by the High Court and, if they do, whether that 
limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account the factors listed in section 
36(1) of the Constitution.’231 The focus of the judgment lays here.  
 
After citing the orders of the High Court as well as the relevant legislative provisions, 
Zondo ACJ engaged with section 5(b) of the Drugs Act of 1992 in detail, evaluating 
the High Court’s ruling as unclear and misleading in terms of declaring this section as 
unconstitutional. Section 5(b) itself, he stated, would not prohibit any dealing in drugs, 
as the High Court read it. His suggestion is to read the section including the definition 
of the phrase ‘deal in’ of section 1 of the Drugs Act of 1992. In this way, according to 
Zondo ACJ, the intended prohibition would be clarified and the unconstitutionality 
would be confirmed to the appropriate extent.232 
The judgement also engaged with the scope as well as the content of the right to 
privacy in detail.233 In partly citing the same cases as Prince II.1, and partly adding 
more, this judgment proves even greater precision of evaluation and scope than the 
High Court one. It is more detailed, and thus, more comprehensive.  
 
This judgement overall confirmed the High Court’s view that the impugned provisions 
limited the right to privacy and that this exact limitation could not be seen as reasonable 
and justifiable in terms of section 36 of the Constitution. The main reason for this view 
were existing, less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.234  
 
As mentioned above, one of the biggest differences in the High Court judgment is that 
the Constitutional Court refrained from using the term ‘dwelling’. Here, the focus was 
 
230 Ibid para 39. 
231 Ibid para 40. 
232 Ibid para 24. 
233 Ibid para 43-57. 




on dagga being cultivated in a private place and meant to be consumed in private by 
an adult person. Interestingly, this private place might also be outside, e.g. a garden; it 
does not have to be inside an enclosure.235 This topic appeared within the discussion 
of section 5(b) of the Drugs Act of 1992 where, as stated above, Zondo ACJ uses a 
different approach than the High Court. At the end of the day, however, he came to the 
same conclusion, revealing an inconsistency in the Constitution.236 Regarding the 
possession, the term ‘dwelling’ is challenged again in latter paragraphs, drawing 
distinctions between different scenarios. This judgment emphasises that the focus 
should not be on the private dwelling but the personal consumption (in private). The 
example used is of someone who steps out of his/her private dwelling in possession of 
dagga, with the intent to use it for personal consumption, will be seen as committing 
an offence – this is contrary to someone possessing dagga within his/her home for the 
same reason.237 Following this line of reasoning, Zondo ACJ concluded this section 
by saying that, in his view, ‘as long as the use or possession of cannabis is in private 
and not in public and the use or possession of cannabis is for personal consumption of 
an adult, it is protected’ by the right to privacy.238  
 
This judgement separates the issue of use, possession, and cultivation from the one of 
purchase. Any dealing in it shall be prohibited. Developing his reasoning, Zondo ACJ 
talked about how dealing in dagga is a ‘serious problem’. In his view, purchasing the 
drug would always happen through a dealer. And since dealing is such a significant 
problem in South Africa, the court cannot (indirectly) allow dealing in dagga, not even 
in the personal sphere. Hence, the court sees the prohibition of dealing in the drug as 
a reasonable and justifiable limitation to the challenged right to privacy.239 The judge’s 
line of reasoning in this section seems to be thoughtful and consistent; he builds his 
reasoning on valid points and comes to a comprehensible conclusion. Nevertheless, 
there is one important counterargument against this reasoning: the lack of a system to 
fight the black market. Legalising and decriminalising dagga, including its trading, 
would create a new, and most importantly, legal, market. Supply chains as well as the 
process of purchase of the customer, including the product’s quality, could be 
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monitored and controlled. Elaborating on this mental-experiment a little more, the 
conclusion is that the black market would suffer severe losses; it might even vanish 
entirely.240 This argument gained popularity among supporters of the 
legalising/decriminalising of dagga. Not including dealing in the drug when 
legalising/decriminalising the use of it, in the way that Zondo ACJ deals with the issue, 
does, however, not outline how to eradicate the black market. Hence, despite the 
judge’s valid reasoning, this lack of fighting the black market by not 
legalising/decriminalising trading dagga, could be seen as a missed opportunity.  
 
Following on his reasoning, Zondo ACJ declared ‘the relevant provisions to be 
constitutionally invalid to the extent that they criminalise the use or possession of 
cannabis in private by an adult for his or her personal consumption in private’.241 
Also within the remedy, practical issues were raised. The judgement engaged with the 
question of how a police officer is supposed to determine whether cannabis in 
someone's possession is meant for personal consumption or not.242 To find a solution, 
the judge proposed to treat the question in a similar way to the crime of negligent 
driving. When applied this way, he stated, it depends on the officer’s observation. The 
conceivable uncertainties created by this subjective observation would not exceed 
those uncertainties which appear in cases of negligent driving but would be 
comparable. In a case of negligent driving, these uncertainties are generally 
accepted.243 Ultimately, however, it would be the court that decides whether the 
requirement of personal consumption is met or not.244 
Davis J, in the High Court case, explicitly named racism as a reason for the harsh dagga 
laws.  Zondo ACJ does not express a similar view, nor does he make any reference to 
the prior judgement concerning this argument. The only section where the term racism 
appears is paragraph 65. There, the outdated language of the former white ruling class 
is reprehended, speaking again of the ‘social evil’. Still, this cannot be seen as dissent 
against Davis J, since Zondo ACJ only cites another court decision without giving his 
own evaluation.245 On the contrary, in not opposing the prior judgement’s reasoning 
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and carefully disproving it, Zondo ACJ may tacitly be demonstrating his agreement 
with Davis J’s view.   
Summarising, it can be said that this Constitutional Court judgement also took a 
significant step, and thus, cannot be seen other than as a big part of the movement 
towards the decriminalisation of dagga. Davis J was the first one to take this bold step 
and decriminalise dagga. With this, he certainly played the biggest part. The 
Constitutional Court confirmed his decision which significantly strengthened the 
decriminalisation as well as the reasoning behind it. In adding more case examples to 
his reasoning, Zondo ACJ entrenched the whole line of argument, hedging it and 
making it even more legitimate. Therefore, the part he played is also of considerable 
importance. Where we go from here and how we can probably make use of the partial 
decriminalisation, will be part of the following chapter. 
 
V. From harsh punishments to decriminalisation – what’s in it for 
the criminal justice system?  
Taking a look back on the past chapter shows that the process of developing and 
reinforcing harsh punishments for minor misconduct appears to be overcome, finally 
leading to the partial decriminalisation of dagga. In this chapter, I will evaluate why 
the recent judgements implementing the partial decriminalisation are of such great 
importance and what kind of benefits they might bring. Ultimately, not only do adult 
individuals, now legally able to use and possess dagga in certain circumstances, benefit 
from the recent decriminalisation, so does society. To expand on this point, this chapter 
will focus on the impact of the partial decriminalisation on the criminal justice system 
by drawing links between the judgements and the functioning of the system.  
As the Retired Justice of the Constitutional Court, Edwin Cameron, demonstrates in 
his recent article, the prisons are desperately overcrowded, therefore providing bad 
conditions for their inmates, and, contrary to the expectations of them as correctional 
facilities, are breeding grounds for more crime.246 South Africa has one of the highest 
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incarceration rates in the world and one of the highest recidivism rates in the world.247 
Therefore, it is hardly surprising that there are warnings of overcrowded prisons 
‘creating crime’ instead of ‘curbing it’.248 Further, statements like ‘our criminal justice 
system is flawed, in some ways fatally defective, and needs to be overhauled’249 are as 
little surprising as they are accurate. This observation of a deteriorating criminal justice 
system is also reflected in statistics, where declining approval rates of the courts are to 
be found, dropping from 63.9 per cent in 2013/14 to only 41.1 per cent in 2017/18.250 
Reasons for this disastrous situation can first and foremost be found in the criminal 
politics of the 1990s and their general shift to harsh new policies.251 The post-apartheid 
expected ‘crime wave’252 as well as the so-called ‘tough (on) crime policy’253 led to 
increased sentences being imposed and growing carceral periods. Without expanding 
the infrastructural and institutional capacity of the prisons, the consequence was an 
increasing prison population, leading to overcrowded buildings not being able to cope 
with the amount of occupants.254 Hence, South African prisons can no longer be seen 
as rehabilitation centres, preparing their inmates for life after prison, but rather as 
overcrowded penal institutions. In the end, the shift towards stricter punishments did 
not result in any improvement regarding crime rates.255  
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Particular attention must be paid to remand prisoners who usually constitute nearly a 
third of the prison population.256 More than half of these remand prisoners, however, 
will be released due to acquittal, withdrawal of the charges or because their charges 
were struck off the roll.257 In this light, it is no surprise that it is said that pre-trial 
detentions contribute immensely to the overpopulation of prisons, especially given the 
fact that many remand prisoners, even if they are to be sentenced, could be released on 
bail but are not able to afford it.258 Their time in prison often turns out to be very hard, 
with remand prisoners and their families often experiencing a heavy and negative 
socio-economic impact such as the loss of the detainee’s work and income as well as 
his/her care and support, while at the same time being subjected to increasing 
emotional distress and altered living arrangements.259 In sum, the situation in remand 
prisons tends to be even worse than in detention centres for convicted detainees, a 
finding, which is also encouraged by data from Pollsmoor.260 
In considering drug crimes in this context, it is important to say that most of the 300000 
people who are arrested for drug-related crimes each year are picked up for small 
cannabis offences.261 Processing these drug arrests takes a considerable amount of 
time, usually two to two-and-a-half hours, time that could better be spent with other 
policing tasks such as patrols.262 In general, and especially regarding drugs, high 
imprisonment rates lead to rising crime, which again increases the fear of crime and 
the demand for harsher punishments, ending in increasing imprisonment rates.263 As 
this vicious circle takes its course, it illustrates best that the so-called ‘war on drugs’, 
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relying on harsh punishments and strict imprisonment, has failed. On the contrary, the 
‘war on drugs’ is wasting extensive resources and lives.264.  
It would be prudent to consider more suitable punishments for drug-related offences, 
especially when they are not violent, such as shorter sentences, probation, community 
service, electronic monitoring, or medical treatment.265 Also, minimum sentences have 
not proved to be overly effective, as Cameron evaluates in detail throughout his article. 
This will not be expanded on here as this is not the focus of the thesis.266 Some scholars 
even go as far as to demand the release of those being incarcerated for drug use or 
possession in order to ease prison overcrowding,267 a request which seems to have 
potential in achieving to lower overcrowding since drug offences constitute around 10 
per cent of all alleged offences.268 Particularly in remand detention, drug offences 
committed by the poorest who are able to afford bail, are overrepresented.269 
Given this scenario described above, the need for change is obvious. The South 
African criminal justice system needs to be unclogged in order to have a chance of 
functioning again. This is where the recent judgements and their direct as well as 
indirect contribution to the functioning of the criminal justice system come into play. 
As evaluated in detail in the previous chapter, the Constitutional Court partially 
decriminalised the use, possession, and cultivation of dagga to the extent of personal 
consumption by an adult in private. Concerning the criminal justice system, the court 
quotes the prior High Court decision that ‘[t]he evidence, holistically read together 
with the arguments presented to this court, suggests that the blunt instrument of the 
criminal law as employed in the impugned legislation is disproportionate to the harms 
that the legislation seeks to curb insofar as the personal use and consumption of 
cannabis is concerned’.270 
On the same page as this quote is the focus of today’s police work regarding dagga. A 
very useful source that helps to assess police intentions is the Western Cape 
 
264 Cameron op cit note 246 at 58; see also Marqua-Harries, Stewart and Padayachee op cit note 249 
at 35 making the same point; Jason Eligh ‘The Evolution of Illicit Drug Markets and Drug Policy in 
Africa’ available at https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2019-06-30-continental-
report-3-3.pdf at 54, accessed on 21 June 2020. 
265 Cameron op cit note 246 at 58. 
266 Cameron op cit note 246.  
267 Eligh op cit note 264 at 57. 
268 Redpath op cit note 257 at 29. 
269 Ibid at 31-2. 




Community Safety on Provincial Policing Needs and Priorities Report 2018|19, 
published on 14 October 2019.271 The report emphatically urges the need for law 
enforcement agencies to not focus on drug users but the drug trade and its 
manufacturing thereof instead.272 This perfectly coincides with the Constitutional 
Court judgement, which explicitly abandons the idea of decriminalising any dealing in 
dagga, saying that there cannot be any purchase - which as such could be 
decriminalised - without a sale.273 At the same time, this explicitness of the 
Constitutional Court might even help raise acceptance and sympathy concerning the 
South African Police Service (SAPS). Noticing a clear focus on dealers and 
manufacturers, people will probably be less afraid to get into trouble or even be 
arrested for small dagga offences. This, however, could promote the acceptance of 
SAPS in society, especially when SAPS representatives trying to solve a case are in 
need of support and call for help from communities. Hence, this goes hand in hand 
with the expressed SAPS strategy to focus on the ones who benefit from trading in 
dagga. SAPS need help from communities to overcome drug-related crime,274 rebuild 
trust, and gain support in fighting the ‘bigger fish’.275  
In line with this approach is another claim to be found in the SAPS report, namely the 
aim of removing drugs from the streets.276 Although this goal did not find its way into 
the Constitutional Court judgement, the judgement might help to achieve it. Favouring 
the use and possession of dagga in private, but still explicitly prohibiting it in public, 
could support the intended removal. With this, we have another instance where the 
Constitutional Court judgement and the SAPS report agree and aim for the same goal.  
In the end, the report concludes that, concerning the fight against drugs, measures other 
than harsher penalties and laws, must be taken.277 This is a take-out which coincides 
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with what supporters of a more liberal drug policy have been demanding for a long 
time. It supports them in their assumption that the ‘war on drugs’ has irrefutably failed.  
Evaluating this from a practical point of view, it seems as if the Constitutional Court 
judgement has already started to have an impact. In December 2016, Pollsmoor has 
had an occupation of 250 per cent278 and there is data suggesting that about 16 per cent 
of all admissions at Pollsmoor Remand Detention Facility in the year preceding July 
2017 were for drug possession.279 The report itself states that before September 2018, 
one out of six remand prisoners at Pollsmoor was there for cannabis possession.280 The 
Constitutional Court judgement, however, seems to have had a significant effect on 
dagga-related arrest numbers since these have decreased by 30.6 per cent in the 
Western Cape since the judgement was handed down.281  
 
1. The possible impact of Sonke Gender Justice 
When talking about declining arrest numbers, we certainly also need to take into 
account the achievements of the non-profit organisation, Sonke Gender Justice, if only 
for reasons of completeness. Sonke Gender Justice has been challenging 
overcrowding, and especially the situation at the Pollsmoor Remand Detention 
Facility, for many years. In December 2016, they experienced a major success when 
the Western Cape High Court decided in their favour, challenging overcrowding at 
Pollsmoor Remand.282 In the aftermath of this order, the number of remand prisoners 
at Pollsmoor decreased significantly, in June 2017 the set goal of less than 150 per 
cent capacity, was met.283 Although these noteworthy short-term improvements are 
certainly having a very positive impact, they were not meant to last long. Being aware 
of the reason why the numbers have decreased so drastically, mainly being transfers 
of prisoners to other facilities, Sonke Gender Justice has already criticised the 
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Government’s plan in handling the situation superficially and ineffectively at this early 
stage.284 One of the major criticisms was that the plan did not tackle any of the 
underlying issues of overcrowding. Thus, this shows that although Sonke Gender 
Justice welcomed the existence of the plan as well as the declining numbers, they did 
not expect the effects to be long-lasting, at least not at this high level. Later figures 
proved them to be right. Having achieved a historical low in June 2017, overcrowding 
levels started to rise again shortly after, reaching 169 per cent in April 2018.285 The 
Government promised improvement. It has, for instance, urged the courts to review in 
detail bail conditions and the process of bail review applications.286 Still, the numbers 
of remand prisoners have varied greatly over the past years, even though they fell 
slowly overall.287 As a result of the above, Sonke Gender Justice challenging 
overcrowding, has certainly had an impact on the decreasing numbers of remand 
prisoners at Pollsmoor after September 2018. However, since apart from the high drop 
in early 2017 the numbers are only going down slowly over the past years, this impact 
is rather to be seen as long-term improvement. Due to the lack of a special incident 
linked to Sonke Gender Justice explaining the drastic decrease of more than 30 per 
cent in the short period of time after the Constitutional Court judgement was handed 
down, they cannot be given sole credit for that drop. The reason is more likely to be 
the court’s decision on the partial decriminalisation of dagga.  
However, the falling numbers are not to be underestimated. Decreasing arrests for 
dagga offences (by nearly a third) mean a significant decrease of total arrests too, and 
thus, of remand prisoners. Fewer remand detainees mean fewer people and their 
families suffering from the negative impact and the losses which cut into their lives 
due to the time spent in prison.288 At the same time, the many other risks and dangers 
related to disproportionally long arrests for small dagga offences, such as being 
recruited by gangs while awaiting trial, or being unable to pay bail, are lowered.  Also, 
less dagga-related arrests might help the criminal justice system to reduce 
overcrowding and relieve the clogged courts of long waiting lists. These decreasing 
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arrest numbers probably indicate that the police choose to apply the judgement wisely 
in practice and follow its suggestions, as they possibly revise arrests. It might also be 
the first indication of a demanded shift from measuring police performance on drug 
policing only on arrests towards measuring it on a more careful scale looking at an 
overall picture of arrests, prosecutions, and convictions.289 In the end, the judgement 
of the Constitutional Court might help to improve the criminal justice system and 
support its recovery. 
 
2. The newly introduced Cannabis Bill  
Another new feature regarding the decriminalisation of dagga is the recent introduction 
of the awaited Cannabis for private purposes Bill (Cannabis Bill)290 by the Parliament. 
In the Bill’s Memorandum to objects, it is referred to the Constitutional Court’s 
decision from September 2018 in which the Parliament was given the task of amending 
certain passages of legal Acts which, according to the judgement, were inconsistent 
with the right to privacy entrenched in section 14 of the Constitution. The court did 
not acknowledge those passages to be reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality, and freedom.  
In accordance with the task given to the Parliament, the preamble declares that the Bill 
is ‘[t]o  
- respect the right to privacy of an adult person to possess cannabis plant 
cultivation material; to cultivate a prescribed quantity of cannabis plants; to 
possess a prescribed quantity of cannabis; and to smoke and consume cannabis; 
- regulate the possession of cannabis plant cultivation material; the cultivation 
of cannabis plants; the possession of cannabis; and the smoking and 
consumption of cannabis by an adult person; 
- protect adults and children against the harms of cannabis; 
- provide for the expungement of criminal records of persons convicted of 
possession or use of cannabis; 
- delete and amend provisions of certain laws; and 
- provide for matters connected therewith.’291   
 
To provide these goals, the Bill contains definitions, exact prescribed quantities for 
personal use by an adult person, various possible offences and penalties as well as 
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regulations and the repeal or amendment of laws. The definitions are provided in order 
to facilitate its interpretation. Clause 2 is meant to emphasise the importance of the 
constitutional right to privacy, enabling an adult person to use, possess, and cultivate 
dagga freely in private. Hence, this clause is seeking to fulfil the demands formulated 
by the judgement. The following clauses, however, introduce justifiable limitations on 
this right to privacy. In detail, clause 3 criminalises the cultivation, possession, 
provisioning, and dealing in cannabis plants and cannabis plant cultivation material 
while clause 4 limits the possession, provisioning, and dealing in dagga itself. Clause 
5 then deals with aspects pertaining to smoking and other methods of consumption of 
dagga. The following clause 6 then imposes offences involving children, offences the 
judgement does not deal with explicitly. The different offences are divided into classes 
from A to D, the sentences for which are regulated in clause 7. Clause 8 provides for 
the expungement of criminal records for certain cases. Concluding the Bill, clause 9 
gives the minister the power to make regulations to further regulate aspects provided 
for in the Bill and clause 10 as well as the attached Schedule 5 engage with the exact 
repeals and amendments of existing pieces of legislation the Parliament was expected 
to make. 
As mentioned above, the Constitutional Court referred it to the Parliament to ensure 
that the queried legal provisions would be in accordance with the Constitution by 18th 
September 2020. Otherwise, the interim arrangements made by the court would 
become final. How the different aspects regarding dagga were regulated would be up 
to the Parliament. The court left it to the legislator to decide on whether to just alter 
the provisions inconsistent with the Constitution or to create a whole new legal Bill. 
Hence, in introducing an Act where the Parliament concentrated different aspects 
regulating dagga in a comprehensive way in one piece of legislation, it acted within 
the given range of opportunities. In this respect, it is not objectionable that the 
Parliament has amended the Drugs Act292 to remove dagga completely from it. This is 
because by deleting dagga as a drug in the sense of Schedule 2, the Act is no longer 
applicable to dagga. Therefore, the provisions of the Drugs Act, which were previously 
applicable to dagga, are no longer referring to such, and thus, are no longer 
incompatible with the Constitution. The new regulations made in the Cannabis Act, 
again, are in accordance with the court's requirements. The Medicines Act293, on the 
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other hand, was not altered. This means that the interim regulations made by the court 
regarding the unconstitutional provisions of the Medicines Act will remain effective 
even though the Cannabis Bill is in place.  
In Schedule 3 and 4, the Cannabis Act made provisions in terms of prescribed 
quantities which also reflect the judgement’s demands. With determining the limits of 
quantities, the legislator has therefore complied with what the court neither wanted to 
claim for itself nor saw itself in the position to assess.  
As evaluated by now, the Bill partially falls short of what the Constitutional Court 
considered to be important and worthy of change. In many ways, however, it goes 
beyond what the court has demanded, not only in terms of creating an entirely new 
Act. Thus, it refers to the National Road Traffic Act from 1996,294 altering numerous 
sections in terms of their reference on drivers under the influence of dagga. The 
National Road Traffic Act has not been mentioned in the Constitutional Court 
judgement at all. This shows that the Parliament used its chance to regulate even more 
than prescribed by the court, the chance to alter some legislation it deemed to be 
changed. Another aspect where the Parliament took the opportunity given to it to go 
beyond the scope of the judgement is the treatment of hemp as a variety of dagga. As 
to the Bill, the Department of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development has 
requested that both the Drugs Act and the Medicines Act be altered in order to provide 
for the commercial production of hemp. In including such regulation, the Parliament 
followed up on this request. 
Also, the significant and extensive protection of children included in the Act as a 
central aspect of such is very interesting. By changing the Child Justice Act of 2008295 
as well as putting explicit emphasise on sufficient age when coming to private use, 
possession, and cultivation of dagga, the legislator protects the weakest members of 
society, children. In doing so, the Parliament took an important step which should 
always be considered when granting more freedom: that living out this freedom is not 
to be at the expense of others but that it is enjoyed without harming anyone else. Thus, 
by easing the regulations regarding dagga for adults in private, it is crucial to, at the 
same time, protect children not being able to protect themselves from effects that might 
be very harmful to their health and growth. In general, the Bill seems to find a good 
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balance between giving freedom to some but also protecting others worth protection 
such as children and other people in public places that do not want to (or should not) 
get in touch with dagga. This can also be seen in explicitly regulating prescribed 
commercial and trafficable quantities.  
Overall, the Bill meets the requirements set out by the judgement. Most of the 
requirements are to be found in the new regulations drawn up by the Bill. Through 
comprehensive regulation in a separate Act, the regulations concerning dagga also 
become clearer and more easily accessible which is a huge advantage. Thus, this Act 
has the potential to put an end to many of the uncertainties and unclarities around 
dagga which society as well as SAPS seem to be struggling with these days. Apart 
from the sections concerning the Medicines Act, the interim provisions made by the 
court will be replaced by the new Bill once enacted. The inclusion of so many different 
departments also testifies to a precise and thorough working method and a process, 
during which the various aspects of the topic were dealt with in detail. All in all, the 
Bill proves itself to be a well-rounded piece of legislation which fits in well, continuing 
the path of liberating dagga policies in South Africa. 
 
VI. Conclusion  
This thesis details the history of the criminalisation of cannabis as well as its partial 
decriminalisation around 100 years later. The decriminalisation was finally achieved 
due to the ruling in Prince II.2 which can be seen as the ‘successor’ of Prince’s well-
known first attempt in 2002. While there are some parallels between Prince’s various 
attempts to challenge the legislation, they differ significantly, not only in their outcome 
but in their approach and scope. The ruling of Prince I in 2002 was pervaded by 
unwillingness. At the time, comfort with the situation as it was seemed to be the 
dominant motive, however in 2018, it was shown that there was more commitment to 
change. Prince II.2 was related to the drive and willingness to bring about change to 
an unjust and outdated setting. But this energy to change has not always been used for 
good as can be noticed when examining the history. 
As described in the second chapter, dagga was cultivated and used by the indigenous 
tribes long before van Riebeeck and the first settlers arrived. The herb was brought to 




medical purposes. Even during the colonial period dagga remained a legal substance, 
until the early 19th century when the settlers' attitude started to change. With the 
implementation of the first national statute in 1922, the long history of harsh 
punishments began, and took its course through the Weeds Act of 1937, the Abuse of 
Dependence-producing Substances and Rehabilitation Centres Act 41 of 1971 and the 
Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992, up until the partial decriminalisation in 
March 2017, which was later confirmed in September 2018.  
In the third chapter, I focus on the punishments implemented by the legislation, 
relating these to the estimated risks posed by dagga, and ultimately confirm dagga to 
be the black sheep among drugs. Differences in the punishments are pointed out, 
leading to the conclusion that punishments for dagga offences were disproportionally 
harsh in terms of its harm, the legal development being inconsistent and inappropriate. 
I would argue that dagga experienced a racialised prohibition. This is followed by 
investigating possible reasons for this disparity, coming to the conclusion that various 
reasons were relevant. With dagga becoming a political issue, making the 'non-white' 
population of their use while keeping the perceived threat originating from it as small 
as possible was crucial for the estimated white superior class. In other words, there are 
very legitimate foundations for the prohibition of dagga, such as medical reasons and 
the protection of the youth, which certainly played a role in prohibiting the drug or at 
least had the potential to do so. And yet, the one reason standing out was racism. 
Furthermore, the subject lacks research which considerably complicates drawing 
conclusions from scientific data.  
Chapter four focuses on the rulings involving the decriminalisation, discussing in 
detail the approaches taken in Prince II.1 and Prince II.2, consensus and differences, 
strengths, and weaknesses. The chapter lays out how the legal situation changed due 
to the judgements and how the use, possession, and cultivation of dagga by an adult 
person in private, has been partially decriminalised. The legal argument behind the 
decriminalisation is the inconsistency of certain regulations prohibiting the use, 
possession, and cultivation of dagga with the right to privacy as referenced from 
section 14 of the Constitution.  
Emphasising the significant and practical impact of the Constitutional Court 
judgement, chapter five links it to the positive effects that it might have on the 




of the South African criminal justice system, which suffers from overcrowded prisons, 
being significantly clogged by small dagga offences. I argue how the situation is the 
best proof of how the so-called ‘war on drugs’, always reacting with harshness and 
stricter, more severe punishments, has failed. Since the judgement was handed down, 
however, imprisonment rates have decreased significantly. This will probably take 
some pressure off the justice system due to decreased overcrowding and less cases 
before the courts. At the same time, it is crucial to argue for a focus on the dealing and 
manufacturing of dagga as well as other, harder drugs and prosecuting the influential 
drug dealers instead of insignificant small-time offenders.  
Although the achievement reached due to the Constitutional Court judgement is 
significant, the discourse around cannabis is still far from complete and will no doubt 
continue to be debated. Now, that we have the Parliament’s decision on how to deal 
with the court’s demands in form of the Cannabis Bill, we certainly came one step 
further. But since it was published very recently, we will have to wait for reactions as 
well as the impact that the Bill will have. 
We also cannot say with certainty that these recent changes will have the desired effect 
of helping the criminal justice system, as pointed out in chapter five. But there seems 
to be a chance that it will. And as long as it might bring significant and lasting 
improvements, the chance to evolve should be grabbed. After seeing how deteriorating 
punishments have failed disastrously, it is worth it to try another way. Dagga ‘is here 
to stay’; it has inevitably ‘become a feature of both the geographical and social 
landscape of southern Africa, and total elimination of the plant is simply not an 
option’.296 That is exactly why it is important to seize the opportunity and tackle it 
now, to ensure practicable and justifiable outcomes. 
Making better outcomes possible would include collecting scientifically reliable data 
and continuing to move forward based on these in order to prevent repetition of the 
same mistakes made in the past. When it comes to dagga offenders, their suffering 
from social stigmatisation for being classified and treated as proper criminals297 is to 
be challenged. It is imperative to focus on improving the functioning of the criminal 
justice system and the provision of some more resources. In addition, it is necessary to 
focus on identifying the more powerful figures in the drug world as well as on harder, 
 
296 Paterson op cit note 4 at 127. 




far more dangerous drugs, with more efficiency. All of this obviously would not make 
up for the strict and unjust history surrounding dagga. Decriminalising but nevertheless 
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